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Abstract. 
An important question in labour economics is whether the presence in a work 
environment of friends or relations lowers or raises productivity. We examine the 
question using evidence from a simple field experiment in Uttar Pradesh, India 
with married wives and husbands. Teams of four are engaged to dig soil under 
the NREGA programme. In one treatment husbands and wives work together; in 
the other treatment they work in separate teams. We find that working with 
spouses is associated with significantly higher productivity.  
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1. Introduction 
Does working alongside friends or relations lower or raise productivity? We 
supplement evidence on the issue through a field experiment in Uttar Pradesh, 
India conducted with married couples. Teams of four are engaged to dig soil. In 
one treatment husbands and wives work together; in the other treatment they 
work in separate teams. We find that working with spouses is associated with 
significantly higher team productivity.  
 
2. Background. 
There are two main motives for the experiment. Some recent work in personnel 
economics examines the impact of non-work relationships on workplace 
productivity (e.g. Mas and Moretti, 2009, Bandiera et al, 2005). This literature 
focuses largely on non-related acquaintances, but particularly in developing 
countries, family members often work alongside one another on farms and 
enterprises (Haddad et al., 1997). Since family members often pool some or all of 
their resources within the household, the response to working with relatives 
might be quite different to the effect of working with non-relatives with whom 
income is not shared. Some evidence is called for. The other motive concerns 
experiments on household decision-making. Recent experiments have found 
significant impacts on spousal behaviour from playing games together (Peters et 
al. 2004), making decisions together (Bateman and Munro, 2005) or altering the 
information shared between partners (Ashraf, 2009, Iversen et al, 2011) in 
laboratory-like settings. For the sake of external validity, it is useful to see 
whether spousal behaviour is sensitive to context in more natural settings1 and 
in particular, when rewards are earned through actual labour. 
                                                 
1
 With features such as onsite assignment to treatment and the presence of non-local supervisors, we do 
not claim this was a natural field experiment. 
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The experiment was conducted by financing work within the rules of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Launched in February 
2006, NREGA is a workfare programme designed to alleviate rural poverty 
amongst working age adults.  This act creates provision for 100 days of unskilled, 
manual employment per year for adult members of rural households. Each 
NREGA worker must pre-register to receive a job card with a specific code 
number which can be shared between spouses. A Block Development Officer 
(BDO) is in charge of the NREGA affairs at every block in the various districts of 
UP.  The BDO in turn hands over the affairs to local officials who run and 
supervise the programme at the village and panchayat level. Although NREGA is 
supposed to be available for all who need it, there is evidence from some states 
(e.g. Datta and Singh, 2012, for West Bengal) that women often face significant 
impediments in their attempts to benefit from the scheme. Nevertheless, there 
are many examples where women are allowed to work and do work alongside 
men, albeit there is often a gendered division of labour for specific jobs ( Khera 
and Nayak, 2009). 
 
 
3. Methodology  
The work in the experiment was the complementary tasks of digging of soil by 
men and the transporting and dumping of soil by women to improve existing 
ponds. Because we wished to compare the effects of working with a spouse to the 
effect of working alone, we needed treatments in which men worked with women 
to whom they were not married. Mixed sex teams of two would have produced 
strong cultural resistance, so we created teams of four with two males and two 
females. All individuals were paid on the basis of the team performance, as 
measured by the volume of soil successfully removed. In treatment one (the 
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control) each team of four consisted of 2 men and 2 women, none of whom were 
married to one another. However, for one man and one woman their spouses 
were working in another site nearby under the same conditions. In treatment two, 
teams also contained 2 men and 2 women but in this case two members of each 
team were spouses. The other two individuals were not married to one another or 
to anyone else taking part in the experiment. The team members were paid at 
the rate of Rs 2 per cubic foot of soil successfully removed from the site and 
dumped, subject to local NREGA rules that dictate a minimum wage of Rs100 per 
working day.2  
 
The fieldwork was carried out in three culturally homogeneous blocks of rural 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) namely, Chunar and Sikhar (in district Mirzapur) and 
Sewapuri (in district Varanasi). Within this area five sites were selected as 
suitable: Samaspur (Chunar), Madiya and Mowiya (Sikhar), Katwarupur and 
Manghipur (Sewapuri). Prior to the experiment the names of the participants 
along with their account number and job card number were randomly selected 
from the NREGA muster roll/ NREGA register that were in the custody of either 
the Pradhan (village head) or Block Development Office for  each site. A total 
sample of 540 workers, stratified by sex (equal numbers) and status (registered 
couples and non-registered) were short listed at the five sites and invited to take 
part. On the days of the experiment, the total number of participants that took 
part was 516.3 A total of 258 participants were in the form of married couples 
                                                 
2 Only 7 out of 86 teams fell below this 50 cubic feet threshold and results reported below 
are not significantly affected by the inclusion of this group. 
3 Here we discuss results from 344 of the participants. The remaining 1/3 were randomly 
assigned to another treatment in which wages were not linked to output and are not 
discussed in this paper. 
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while 129 male and 129 female were unaccompanied individuals. 4   The 
experiments were carried out over 4 days: digging at sites number 2 (Madiya) 
and 3 (Mowiya) were carried out on the same day (day 2) to prevent 
contamination of data between the neighbouring villages and achieve the target 
of playing a total of 30 groups per day.   
 
On a game day the participants from the prepared list were ticked for presence 
and randomly assigned to treatment. Afterwards, each team was taken to their 
designated spots with a team number and an area of 12 x 10 ft or 10 x 8 ft area to 
dig as a team. Each experimenter gave the information for each treatment to 
each team separately. Each team was given 3.5 hours to work. The time of start 
of each team was recorded by the experimenter for each treatment and the time 
of stop was pre-calculated. The teams were asked to dump the mud at roughly 
the similar distance (measured as 15-20 walking steps) from each pit, depending 
on the area. The workers were asked to dig for 3.30 hours (which was timed) and 
than take a lunch break and come back to their pits. Post lunch the experimenter 
publicly measured the length, breadth and height of the pit dug by each team. 
The earnings of the team were then calculated and then team members were 
paid-off individually.  
 
In this context, when the spouses are separated as in treatment 1, they cannot 
coordinate their efforts. When they play in the same game, they can coordinate. 
Typically, therefore we would expect that, for players from a cooperative 
household average output will be higher when spouses play together than when 
apart. However, male and female effort is complementary in this game, meaning 
                                                 
4 Many of these individuals have spouses who were not themselves registered for the 
NREGA scheme. 
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that there may be multiple Nash equilibria.  Treatment may move play from one 
equilibrium to another.  
 
To see this, it may be useful to introduce a basic model of the design in order to 
aid the interpretation of the results. Individual reward in this experiment is 
proportional to team output, y, which in turn is given by the expression 
),min( 4231 xxxxy ++=  where xis i=1,3 are the digging efforts of the males and 
xis i=2,4, are the transporting efforts of the females. Odd numbers represent 
males and even numbers are females. The representative couple in the 
experiment are identified by i=1 and i=2. If effort costs are proportional to the 
square of effort, then individual payoffs are: 24231 ),min( ii xxxxx α−++  where αi 
is a positive parameter that may vary across individuals.5  
 
Consider a household that maximizes a weighted average of its net payoffs.  
When the spouses are separated as in treatment 1, each spouse takes part in his 
or her own game. The household payoffs are, 
 222
2
1182756431 )1(),min()1(),min( xxxxxxxxxx αλλαλλ −−−++−+++  
For an individual, i, let –i be the other person with the same gender, let I be the 
set of the same gender members of the team and let –I be the set of opposite 
gender players in the team. At any Nash equilibrium,  
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5 Though the production function is a reasonable approximation to the reality of the task, 
the quadratic form for effort costs is introduced for expositional simplicity.  
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Because of the functional form for the output function, in general there are 
multiple Nash equilibria. At what we call the largest (in terms of team output) 
such equilibrium6,  
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Meanwhile, when the spouses work in the same team as in treatment 2, the 
household payoff is,  
2
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2
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If the household chooses x1 and x2 together and other players each maximize 
their own payoffs then at any Nash equilibrium,  
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It follows that as long as λ ε (0,1) then at the largest Nash equilibrium, average 
output is higher when spouses play together than when apart. In particular if the 
household places equal weight on the partners and all players have the same 
effort costs, then expected output is 50% higher in treatment 2 compared to 
treatment 1. However, two other effects might also cause a difference between 
                                                 
6
 Generically, the strategies that support the largest equilibrium are non-unique, though there is a 
unique output level consistent with Nash equilibrium.  
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treatments. First, it is possible that the largest Nash equilibrium is not the 
equilibrium actually played in the game and moreover that the treatment moves 
teams from one equilibrium to another. Secondly, the appropriate household 
model may not be a cooperative one. In particular, individual effort may be 
harder to observe when couples are apart and this may lead to different 
behaviour between treatments (Ashraf, 2009). In both these cases, it is 
theoretically possible for output to be lower when spouses play in the same 
team.7 
 
4. Results. 
Altogether, in each of the two treatments there were 172 participants making 86 
teams of four.  Table 1 sets out some basic information obtained in an ex-post 
survey. In addition to obvious questions such as age, land-owned, education and 
social group, we asked individuals about the time they typically spend working 
with their spouses in a standard week. We also asked them to specify how many 
members of their team were known to them prior to the experiment. Mean 
responses do not differ significantly between treatments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7  That may seem unlikely, but for instance suppose that spouses are engaged in a 
repeated game and condition their post-game behaviour on in-game effort. Low effort is 
punished and high effort is rewarded by subsequent behaviour. When effort is observable 
this is straightforward, but when spouses work in different teams only output is 
observable. In this situation, subjects working separately might work harder so as to 
decrease the probability of the bad signal provided by low output. 
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Table 1. Summary of Means. 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Age (years) 38.2 40.0 
Land owned (acres) 0.22 0.14 
Household size 6.3 6.5 
Of which aged 15-60 3.2 3.6 
Cast and Tribe (%)   
Scheduled caste  50.9 68.4 
Scheduled tribe  2.92 1.17 
Other backward caste 37.4 24.6 
Upper caste 0.0 0.0 
Other 8.77 5.85 
Number in team known to you 2.37 2.2 
Education level, female  1.18 1.13 
Education level, male 1.79 1.63 
Hours spent working with spouse per week 37.7 33.3 
N 172 172 
Education:  1 = not literate, 2 = only primary school; 3 = secondary level or above. 
All variables are self-reported. 
 
The key result is summarized in figure 1 which shows the distribution of output 
for the two treatments. The frequency scale reports the number of individuals in 
each output class. Mean group output was 169 for treatment 2 and 111.9 for 
treatment 0, a difference of approximately 50% and we reject the hypothesis of no 
treatment effect at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney test on teams, z=4.024, p<0.001).  
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Figure 1. Distribution of output by treatment. 
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Table 2 summarizes regression results using only the data for couples where both 
spouses took part in the field experiment. The first equation has dummies for 
treatment 2 and the locations. The second equation has a fuller set of control 
variables. It contains an interactive term with hours in the week spent working 
together and there are also two variables for the age of the oldest male and 
female member of the team and a dummy variable which equals 1 only if the 
couple have a joint account for NREGA payments. The key result is the same as 
that shown in figure 1: mean output is higher in the treatment when couples 
work together.  
 
Most controls are not significant, but four sites show significantly lower output 
than Samaspur. Local research teams noted higher temperatures at these sites 
and harder soil conditions, suggesting that heat played a role in productivity. We 
have estimated equations with interaction terms between treatment and site, 
and there is no evidence that the impact of the sites varies with treatment. The 
coefficients on time working and the interactive term have opposite signs and the 
absolute values are not significantly different from one another. In other words 
generally, couples who work more often together in daily life have higher 
productivity. However, for these couples, the impact of treatment is weaker. The 
number of known players in the game is also positively associated with 
productivity, while a higher value for the age of the oldest female in the group is 
associated with lower output. Finally, separate NREGA bank accounts are 
associated with higher productivity.8  
                                                 
8
 It is worth noting that there is a strong negative correlation between working together and having a 
separate bank account.  
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Table 2. Regression results (dependent variable = soil volume). 
 Site dummies only Full set of controls 
Constant 145.950*** 102.140*** 
 (10.432) (2.878) 
Treatment 58.000*** 111.333*** 
 (4.636) (3.567) 
Hours working together (per week)  1.206*** 
  (3.272) 
Treatment x Hours working together  -1.383*  
  (-1.780) 
Madiya -17.250  -52.297*** 
 (-1.065) (-2.777) 
Mowiya -63.117*** -79.518*** 
 (-3.047) (-4.112) 
Katwarupur -49.677*** -69.455*** 
 (-3.136) (-3.844) 
Manghipur -40.859*  -59.898*** 
 (-1.925) (-3.094) 
Scheduled Tribe  21.687  
  (0.527) 
OBC (“Other backward caste”)  4.204  
  (0.330) 
Other  -16.651  
  (-0.919) 
Known members of group  11.176*** 
  (2.835) 
Age  0.531  
  (0.958) 
Landholding  -6.244  
  (-0.650) 
Education   2.652  
  (0.516) 
Age of oldest female in group  -0.967**  
  (-2.202) 
Age of oldest male in group  -0.020  
  (-0.034) 
Separate bank accounts  32.673*** 
  (2.760) 
N 172 172 
R2 0.215 0.403 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Omitted category: Scheduled Caste. Standard 
errors clustered on teams. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion. 
In this simple field experiment, mixed sex teams of four dig holes and move dirt 
to another site nearby. Couples are randomly assigned to one of two treatments. 
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In the first, couples work separately and in the second couples work together. In 
all cases the team is paid according to the volume of soil removed successfully in 
a working day. We find that teams with paired couples consistently outperform 
teams where spouses are separated from their partners. The output gap between 
the two systems is large, by approximately 50%. This result is consistent with a 
household model in which equal weight is placed on both partners and effort 
costs are proportional to the square of the output. However, it is also consistent 
with a change of Nash equilibrium between treatments and with some forms of 
non-cooperative model of the household in which team working enables spouses 
to monitor more closely the efforts of the partner (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In 
contrast to some of the recent work on social connections and the workplace, we 
also find a positive relationship between output and other kinds of social contact.  
 
A feature of our results is that couples who work together more frequently 
outside the experiment have higher productivity within the control group. 
However, within treatment 2 the effect is not significant. It is possible that 
spouses who do not work regularly together are more strategic within their 
marital relationship compared to spouses who work together. That is, spouses 
who do not work together, shirk when not being observed by their partners.  
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